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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
entries prior to service-of. a writ of garnishment in ordet, to claim the setoff.,
It is sufficient that there be a valid matured debt owing to the bank.9 The
word "matured", when applied to commercial paper means the time when
the paper. becomes, due and demandable, and 411 action can be maintained
thereon to enforce payment.'?. WVhile "in acceleration clause creates the
right to consider the note due and'phyblc, it is not self-executing. It creates
a mere option in the holder to treat the note as due." Thus, in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, a bank has the absolute right, of setoff where
a debt has matured prior. to garnishment proceedings.
The instant case poses the following question. Did the recital providing
for acceleration when the obligee deemed the debt insecure, -'2 mature the
debt at some instance prior to garnishment? Pursuant to the decision
in Nickell v. Bradshaw,'5 and parallel cases, 4 an acceleration clause creates
a mere option to treat the note as due. Here, although the option existed
ab initio, it was not exercised until after garnishment. Thus, it appears that
the court in the noted case erroneously rendered the decision in favor of
the bank.
In defense of the court, although not stated in the opinion, it may be
contended that, since the event accelerating payment' 5 was in the exclusive
control of the bank, it is analogous to a demand note which is considered
matured ab initio."'
Douglas C. Kaplan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Defendant was tried for comnmission of a felony., A mistrial resulted
because a state's witness refused to testify, claiming privilege against self-
incrimination. Held, the defendant's rights under the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment' were not violated. Therefore, a second trial did
8. Thus, the garnishee is not limited to showiing that it once had a claim which
was collected by a bookkeeping entry before the writ was served. Aarons v. Pub. Service
Building & Loan Co., 318 Pa. 113, 178 Ati. 141 (1935).
9. Walters v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 7 Cal.2d 28, 59 P.2d
983 (1936).
10. Ardmore State Bank v. Lee, 61 Okla. 169, 159 Pac. 903 (1916).
11. Nickell v. Bradshaw, 94 Ore. 580, 183 Pac. 12 (1919).
12. ". . . or should the holder of this note deem the debt insecoie, the full amount
evidenced hereby shall become due and payable immediately at the election of the
holder of this note." State Nat. Bank of Decatur at Oneonta v. Towns, 62 So.2d 606,
607 (Ala. 1952). •
13. See note 11 su ra.
14. Holt v. Guaranty & Loan Co., 136 Ore. 272, 296 Pac. 852 (1931); Harrison
v. Beals, I11 Ore. 563, 222 Pac. 728 (1924).
15. Considering the debt insecure.
16. Beilanski v. Say. Bank, 313 Mass. 577, 48 N.E.2d 627 (1943).
1. U. S. CoNs'r. AMIEND, XIV (nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
CASES NOTED
not place him in double jeopardy. Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349
(1953).
At one time the trend of the decisions was to make the 14th Amendment
all inclusive as to the original Bill of Rights, deeming these fundamental
rights worthy of the protection from State encroachment.' Judicial con-
struction has brought such rights as freedom of speech,3 press, 4 religion,"
and benefit of counsel6 within the protective veil of due process. However,
the federal courts have refused to extend this constitutional safeguard to
include double jeopardy.7 The framers of the Constitution, in incorporating
the plea of double jeopardy within the 5th Amendment, apparently did not
intend to create a new plea, but rather to further the common law pleas
of former acquittal (autrefois acquit) and former conviction (autrefois con-
vict) .,
North Carolina is one of five states0 not expressly prohibiting double
jeopardy in its constitution. 10 On the other hand, their Supreme Court
held that to be tried twice for the same offense would be a denial of due
process." In other words, their due process clause was interpreted to
include double jeopardy as one of the constitutional safeguards owed its
citizens.'
2
The real question in the noted case is not the moot question of
whether double jeopardy, as expressed in the 5th Amendment, is included
within the 14th Amendment. It is a more fundamental issue of whether
the term "double jeopardy" has any real existence separate from the 5t
Amendment. 3 The deterioration of due process has taken many forms but
it reached its lowest ebb in the Palko casc.14  In that case a defendant
was convicted of a lesser degree of homicide after being indicted for
murder in the first degree. The right of the state to appeal was upheld as
not placing defendant in double jeopardy.
The original concept of double jeopardy has been so abridged, miscon-
strued and distinguished by the learned justices that today the terms mean
liberty, or property without due process of law).
2. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Lisen v. California, 314 U.S,
219 (1941).
3. Dejonge v, Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
4. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S, 697 (1932); Citlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
5. Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
6. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
8. PERKINS, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CRIMINAL LAw, p. 650.
9. Conn., Md., Mass., N.C. and Vt..
10. N.C. CONST., Art. 1, § 17. "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned or dis-
seized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled or in any manner
deprived of his life, liberty or popety but by the law of the land."
11. State v. Collins, 169 N.C. 323, 84 S.E. 1049 (1915).
12, State v. Mansfield, 207 N.C. 233, 176 S.E. 761 (1934).
13. Ex Parte Ulrich, 42 Fed. 587 (\.D. Mo. 1890) (defendant was tried and
acquitted and brought to trial again on same offense),
14. See note 7 supra.
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little or nothing, 15 at least as to the 14th Amendment. Therefore, it is
submitted that but one conclusion can be drawn - that double jeopardy is
no longer a distinguishable element in this area of our federal rights.
Rather, it is a vague concept to be considered in detenining whether the
defendant has been given a "fair trial" as that concept has been developed
in the 14th Amendment.
F. Stewart Elliott
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOYALTY OATHS-DUE PROCESS
An Oklahoma statute required that state officers and employees
take a loyalty oath swearing they are not now, and for five years prior to
the taking of the oath have not been members of, or affiliated with,
organizations listed by the United States Attorney General as Communist
front or subversive.1  Plaintiff seeks to enjoin payment of compensation
to school teachers who refused to subscribe. Held, that the statute is an
arbitrary assertion of power and offends due process because it fails to
distinguish between innocent membership and knowing activity in a sub-
versive organization. Wieman v. Updegraff, 73 S. Ct. 215 (1952).
A great majority of the attacks upon state and federal statutes prescrib-
ing loyalty oaths have been unsuccessful.2  The courts have held that
these statutes do not infringe upon the freedom guaranteed by the First,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.3  Although the right to free speech
carries with it the corresponding right to be silent,4 either right may be
denied if its exercise would present a "clear and present danger" that it
15. Meador v. Williams, 117 Mo. 564, 92 S.W. 151 (1906) (four state's witnesses
had been examined but material witness was absent); Pizano v. State, 20 Tex. 139,
54 Am. Rep. 511 (1891) (State's Att'y had not subpoenaed his witness). Contra: State
v. Dove, 222 N.C. 162, 22 S.E.2d 231 (1942) (court ordered mistrial since evidence
desired by state was not presently available .
16. In re Kemnder, 136 U.S. 436 (184, United States v. Cruikshank. 92 U.S. 542
(1875); State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894); Article, 35 YALE, L.J. 674
(1926).
1. Oxi.A ST'rAT. lit. 51, §§ 37.1-37,8 (1951). "1 ....................................... do
solemnly swear . . . that I am not affiliated directly or indirectly with the Communist
Party, the Third Communist International, with any foreign agency, party, organiza-
tion, association or group whatever which has been officially determined by the
United States Attorney General or other authorized agency to he a communist front
or subversive organization .. . that within the five (5) years immediately preceding
the taking of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of the Communist
Party, the Third Communist International, or of any agency, party, organization,
association ...."
2. E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1950); American
Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); l)worken v. Cleveland
Board of Education, 94 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio 1950).
3. E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1950); Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1949); National Maritime Union v. Herzogg,
78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C, 1948)
4. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
